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Dear Friends of Verfassungsblog,
One of the hottest topics of this exceedingly hot summer in Germany, while I was taking a
break from my weekly editorial, was the ominous affair of Sami A., a hard-core Salafi
preacher from Bochum who allegedly had once been Osama Bin Laden’s bodyguard and,
after a heavy campaign by the tabloid newspaper BILD, was finally deported to his native
Tunisia on August 15. What made this a matter of particular constitutional concern was the
fact that the authorities had deported the man in spite or even in open defiance of a court
injunction which had explicitly forbidden it. The outrage of the legal community was not
exactly assuaged when the responsible Home Secretary of the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia, a former CDU MEP named Herbert Reul, called on the courts not to detach
themselves too far from the "legal feelings" (Rechtsempfinden) of the population. The
implication was clear: That the law should protect a buddy of Bin Laden from being sent
back to his home country is just unacceptable to most people, torture hazard or not, and
that has somehow to be taken into account when finding the law. And if the courts fail to do
that, it’s them who are to blame if officials elected by the people choose to go along with
the Rechtsempfinden instead of obeying the orders of the courts.
That caused a considerable public outcry, for obvious reasons: Both the executive and the
judicial branches of government, under Article 20 (3) of the Grundgesetz,  are bound by the
law and the law alone, as opposed to popular opinion which is notoriously prone to flirt with
the most appalling things like torture and police brutality and capital punishment and
mustn’t be trusted in general, particularly not in these times of right-wing populism on the
rise. Some were reminded by Reul’s choice of words of the Nazi term "gesundes
Volksempfinden" (sound opinion/feeling of the people), which had been introduced into
German penal law in the 30s as a basis to prosecute people for deeds that wouldn’t have
been punishable under statutory law alone – one of the prime examples of how Nazi
legislation perverted the rule of law.
None of that is wrong, but it misses the crucial point, in my view. What is scandalously
wrong and dangerous about the minister’s choice of words, even more than its reference
to VOLKSempfinden, is its reference to VolksEMPFINDEN.
The word Empfinden, both as a noun and as a verb, has a distinctly romantic, sentimental
ring to it which suggests that you experience the world in an immediate, uncommunicated
and uncommunicable way, as an impression of your soul, a matter not of sensibility but of
sensitivity: You just feel it.
That’s all very well if you apply it to the Rhine or gothic cathedrals or the deep, dark
German oak forest. But in conjunction with the law it is a recipe for disaster. With the law,
there is nothing to empfind about.
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In a democratic state, the law is what the democratically constituted people decides to be
collectively binding, a text that, as all texts, requires interpretation to determine how
individual cases should be decided. The deciding part is what judges do. The interpreting
part, however, is in principle open to everyone. Judge, law professor, dentist, plumber –
everyone has an equal right to hold and express his or her opinion about what the law is
and what the law should be. We don’t live in a time any more where the law is handed
down by some higher wisdom for the people to dutifully obey, do we? Of course judges
should care about what people say about what the law is. Why shouldn’t they? Who are
they to rule out that they might learn something useful?
Interpreting the law, however, is a risky thing. Your interpretation will be contested. You’ll
have to give reasons. You’ll have to open yourself to criticism. You’ll be attacked. You
might find that you don’t know the facts well enough to defend yourself. That there are
things and aspects you haven’t thought about. That you may have to eat your words. That
you may look foolish.
Any dentist or a plumber prepared to take that risk is as perfectly entitled to be heard and
taken seriously with her interpretation of the law as any law professor. Not so with
sentiments, however. What a person feels about the law is of no concern or relevance to
anybody but herself, and certainly not to the judiciary. The unpleasant sensations one
person might experience facing Sami A.’s deportation are, as far as the law is concerned,
just as pointless as the discomfort another person harbours in her soul about his possible
return.
To revert to sentiments is the strategy of those who want to be right without having to
argue. What a person feels can’t be contested, can’t even be discussed, one just has to
believe it, and if another person doesn’t and contests and criticizes those feelings, she
gives offense against which you’ll defend yourself not with arguments but with force. That is
basically what the bulk of right-wing populist discourse boils down to. That is also why the
Nazis liked Volksempfinden so much. That is what a state under the rule of law must
distance itself from if it wants to survive.
Faits accomplis
Over the summer, when I paused with this editorial, Verfassungsblog remained active, and
we rarely had reason to complain about a lack of issues. I’ll limit myself to the last few
weeks.
First of all, our constant worry Poland: The PiS government and the newly subjugated
National Council of the Judiciary have set out to create a fait accompli in the struggle to
bring the Supreme Court under PiS’s thumb once and for all, in the face the ongoing
"dialogue" with the EU Commission and the desperate protests of the Polish judges'
association, the Ombudsman and civil society. The National Council of Justice has already
nominated a number of new judges for the Supreme Court, who must now be appointed by
President Andrzej Duda. Then, Duda can pick one of them as the new Chief Justice to
replace the incumbent Małgorzata Gersdorf, who to date still opposes her forced early
retirement on the basis of her six-year term of office enshrined in the Constitution. Once the
new judges are in office, it will not be easy to get rid of them again, even if the European
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Court of Justice in Luxembourg should later come to the conclusion that the interference
with the independence of the judiciary was incompatible with EU law. Hungary has already
successfully demonstrated how to pull this off.
At the beginning of August, the Polish Supreme Court, with the courage of desperation,
itself submitted questions on judicial independence as a requirement of EU law to the
European Court of Justice, analyzed by ROBERT GRZESZCZAK and IRENEUSZ
KAROLEWSKI. The big question is whether the ECJ will accept this question as relevant to
the decision of the specific case and will therefore consider the referral admissible, which is
not necessarily self-evident. STANISŁAW BIERNAT, the former vice-president of the Polish
constitutional court, who has experienced the hardships of PiS justice policy at first hand
like hardly anyone else, describes together with MONIKA KAWCZYŃSKA what this
problem is about and how it could be solved.
India is currently goverened by people whose Hindu nationalism does not shy away from
much, as the recent example in the north-eastern state of Assam shows. There the
government in Delhi threatens to banish the Muslim minority into statelessness.
CATHARINA CASPARI reports (German).
This summer, Germany was struck by one of the periodically recurring discussions about
introducing a term of compulsory national service. TIM WIHL investigates how such a duty
would have to be structured to pass the numerous constitutional and human hurdles it
would have to face (German).
GRIETJE BAARS took a closer look at the German draft law to comply with the ruling of
the Federal Constitutional Court and to create a third option in civil status law alongside
Male and Female and does not find the result at all satisfactory.
Meanwhile, in France, the National Assembly has passed a bill to tighten the right of
asylum. CATHERINE HAGUENAU-MOIZARD examines what it contains and what
constitutional questions it raises.
The international legal problem of rescuing refugees on the Mediterranean has also been
on hotly discussed this summer and will apparently not go away anytime soon. NELE
MATZ-LÜCK disentangles the threads of international law and concludes, among other
things, that the practice of Italian ships to return refugees to Libya is clearly contrary to
international law (German).
ELAINE FAHEY reports on Facebook’s procedural attempts before the Irish Supreme
Court to torpedo the judicial review of the EU-US data protection agreement – an epic
battle with potentially immense legal, potential and economic consequences.
Elsewhere
MANUEL MÜLLER examines the prospects of new transnational parties that want to run
for next year’s European Parliament elections (German).
PIERRE DE VOS tries to calm the overheated debate about an amendment of the
constitution of South Africa to facilitate the expropriation of (white) landowners.
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OONA HATHAWAY is dampening hopes that US President Trump will be impeached after
two of his former companions have been convicted or plead guilty, even in the case of the
Democrats gaining a majority in the House of Representatives this fall.
MASAHIRO KUROSAKI explains how the constitutional restrictions on national self-
defense in Japan have changed since 2014 through reinterpretation of the Constitution.
LAUREN AARONS makes her readers aware of the plight of thousands of defenseless
women in Nigeria and Iraq suspected of being connected to IS and Boko Haram,
respectively.
BÁRBARA MENDONÇA BERTOTTI looks back on the constitutional capping of state
expenses in Brazil since 2016 and discusses ways of getting rid of this socially brutal and
potentially even unconstitutional piece of constitutional law.
ANTON LOVIN examines how the new transplantation law in Ukraine punches holes into
the ban on organ trafficking and what international law problems that causes.
That’s it for this week. On our own behalf, our editorial assistant CARLA DIETMAIR has
decided to turn to new shores, namely those of the Republic of Colombia, where she
intends to travel for a while before starting her Referendariat next year. I very much hope
that she will also do some reporting from this exciting region for Verfassungsblog. We
remaining editors thank Carla and wish her tons of fun and success! At the same time, we
are very proud and happy that the fabulous SINTHIOU BUSZEWSKI has agreed to join our
Associate Editors team as an expert for international law and human rights. A very warm
welcome!
All the best, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
P.S. Oh, and one more thing: Are you already a supporter of Verfassungsblog? If not, and if
you enjoy what we do and like our service, please consider joining the slowly, but steadily
growing community of donors. They help keeping VB afloat and independent, for the puny,
measly sum of just 4 piddly Euros per month each! All you have to do is click here.
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